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Abstract
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing de-
ferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove
that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manip-
ulates, then all other women weakly beneﬁt and all men are weakly harmed. We show
that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions
model.
1 Introduction
We study the eﬀect of strategic agents on non-strategic agents in two-sided matching markets.
Consider the marriage market introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) where the two (ﬁnite)
sides of the market are “men” and “women,” each agent having preferences over the other
side of the market and the prospect of being alone. An outcome for a marriage market is a
matching in which each agent either marries an agent from the other side of the market or
remains single. A key property for a matching is stability. A matching is stable if each agent
has an acceptable match and there is no pair of a man and a woman who like each other
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1better than their current matches. Using their deferred acceptance algorithm, Gale and
Shapley (1962) constructively proved that there exists a stable matching for each proﬁle of
preferences. Moreover, Knuth (1976) showed that the set of stable matchings is a distributive
lattice with respect to the preferences of the agents. An important consequence is that on
the set of stable matchings each side of the market has common interests that are in conﬂict
with those of the other side.1
In this note, we show that the conﬂict and coincidence of interests extends to the eﬀects
of manipulations in the direct-revelation games based on the deferred acceptance algorithm.2
Consider the direct-revelation mechanism induced by the men-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm. It is in the best interest of each man to report his true preferences (Dubins
and Freedman, 1981, and Roth, 1982), but women typically have incentives to misreport
their true preferences. Concerning her strategic options, a woman needs to consider only
truncation strategies, which are the strategies obtained by removing a tail of men (i.e., some
least preferred men) from her (true) ordered list of acceptable men. More precisely, for any
(general) manipulation by a woman, there is a truncation strategy which is at least as good.
We show that under the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism,
• truncating preferences by some women is weakly beneﬁcial to all other women and
weakly harmful to all men (Proposition 3.2), and
• any weakly successful group manipulation3 by women is weakly beneﬁcial to all other
women and weakly harmful to all men (Proposition 3.3).
Finally, we consider extending our results to the many-to-one college admissions model
where students have to be assigned to colleges (with possibly multiple seats). A minor
adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3.2 shows that under the student-proposing deferred
acceptance mechanism, any truncation of preferences by some colleges is weakly beneﬁcial to
the other colleges and weakly harmful to all students. However, Kojima and Pathak (2009)
showed that under the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, truncation strate-
gies typically do not exhaust the strategic options of the colleges. They proved that so-called
dropping strategies constitute a class of exhaustive strategies. A dropping strategy of a col-
lege is obtained by removing some students from its (true) ordered lists of acceptable students
(i.e., not necessarily a tail of least preferred students). We show that neither of our results
1See also Roth (1984) and Roth (1985b) for further results on polarization of interests in two-sided
markets.
2For the important role of the deferred acceptance algorithm in both matching theory and many real-life
applications we refer to Roth (2008).
3That is, none of the manipulating agents is strictly worse oﬀ.
2extends to the college admissions model in an appropriate way: there are dropping strategies
and successful manipulations that strictly harm some other college and strictly beneﬁt some
student.
Our results complement work by Crawford (1991) who studied general many-to-one
matching markets and investigated the eﬀect of the entrance of an agent on the welfare
of the other agents. When restricted to the marriage market, his result is the particular case
of our ﬁrst result in which a woman submits an empty truncation strategy.
2 Model
In Gale and Shapley’s (1962) marriage market there are two non-empty, ﬁnite, and disjoint
sets of agents M (men) and W (women). A generic man, woman, and agent are denoted
by m, w, and i, respectively. Each agent i has a complete, transitive, and strict preference
relation Pi over the agents on the other side of the market and the prospect of being alone.
Let P = (Pi)i∈M∪W denote the proﬁle of all agents’ preferences.
For w,w′ ∈ W ∪ {m}, we write wPm w′ if man m strictly prefers w to w′ (w  = w′), and
wRm w′ if m likes w at least as well as w′ (wPm w′ or w = w′). Similarly, we write mPw m′
and mRw m′. A woman w is acceptable to a man m if wPm m. Analogously, m is acceptable
to w if mPw w.
With some abuse of notation we also represent a man m’s preferences Pm as an ordered
list of the elements in W ∪ {m}. For instance, Pm = w3 w2 mw1 ... w4 indicates that m
prefers w3 to w2 and he prefers remaining single to any other woman. Similarly, woman w’s
preferences can be represented as an ordered list Pw of the elements in M ∪ {w}. We often
omit the unacceptable agents from agent i’s ordered list Pi.
A marriage market is a triple (M,W,P), or P for short. A matching is a one-to-one
function µ from M ∪ W to itself, such that for each m ∈ M and for each w ∈ W we have
µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m, µ(m)  ∈ W implies µ(m) = m, and similarly µ(w)  ∈ M
implies µ(w) = w. If µ(m) = w, then man m and woman w are matched to one another.
If µ(i) = i, then agent i is unmatched or single. Agent µ(i) is called i’s match at µ. We
sometimes use a vector of men (or women) to denote a matching, e.g., µ = (m3, m1, m2)
denotes the matching where w1 is matched to m3, w2 to m1, and w3 to m2.
A matching µ is individually rational if µ(i)Ri i for all i ∈ M ∪ W. A pair (m,w) is
a blocking pair for a matching µ if wPm µ(m) and mPw µ(w). A matching is stable if it
is individually rational and if there are no blocking pairs. Gale and Shapley (1962) proved
constructively that each marriage market has at least one stable matching. For this they
3introduced the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Let Q be a proﬁle of ordered lists of
acceptable agents. The men-proposing DA algorithm applied to Q, denoted by DA(Q) for
short, ﬁnds a matching through the following steps.
Step 1: Each man m proposes to the woman that is ranked ﬁrst in Qm (if there is no such
woman then m remains single). Each woman w tentatively accepts the best man among her
proposers (using the list Qw). All other proposers are rejected.
Step k, k ≥ 2: Each man m that is rejected in Step k − 1 proposes to the next woman
in his list Qm (if there is no such woman then m remains single). She tentatively accepts
the best man among the new proposers and the tentatively matched man from the previous
step, if any (using the list Qw). All other proposers are rejected.
The algorithm stops when no man is rejected. Then, all tentative matches become ﬁnal.
With some abuse of notation, let µ(Q) denote the matching. For i ∈ M ∪ W, let µ(Q,i)
denote the match of agent i at µ(Q). Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that for preference
proﬁle Q matching µ(Q) is the best (worst) stable matching for the men (women). Dubins
and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) proved that under the direct-revelation mechanism
induced by µ it is a weakly dominant strategy for the men to reveal their true preferences.
Therefore, we will assume that men are truthful and that women are the only strategic
agents. Whenever there are at least two stable matchings some woman have incentives to
misreport their true preferences (see for instance Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Corollary 4.12).
3 Results
Before we present our results on the direct-revelation mechanism induced by the men-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, we ﬁrst provide the formal deﬁnitions of two classes
of manipulations.
Let P be a marriage market. A truncation strategy (Roth and Rothblum, 1999) of a
woman w is a strategy (or equivalently, an ordered list) P ′
w obtained from Pw by making
a tail of acceptable men unacceptable. Formally, P ′
w is a truncation strategy if for all
m,m′ ∈ M, (a) [if mR′
w m′R′
w w then mRw m′Rw w], and (b) [if mP ′
w w and m′ Pw m then
m′ P ′
w w].
A (group) manipulation by a group of women W ′ is a strategy-proﬁle PW ′ = (Pw)w∈W ′.
If |W ′| = 1, then PW ′ is an individual manipulation. A manipulation is weakly success-
ful if for all w ∈ W ′, µ(P ′,w)Rw µ(P,w) where P ′ = (P ′
W ′,P−W ′). A manipulation is suc-
cessful if for all w ∈ W ′, µ(P ′,w)Rw µ(P,w) and for some w′ ∈ W ′, µ(P ′,w′)Pw′ µ(P,w′).
4Note that not every truncation strategy is a weakly successful manipulation. For in-
stance, an empty truncation strategy leaves the woman unmatched. Likewise, not every
weakly successful, individual manipulation is a truncation strategy (see, for instance, Exam-
ple 1). However, truncation strategies are exhaustive in the sense that any weakly successful,
individual manipulation can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation strategy.4
The following well-known result states that men and women have opposite interests
whenever a manipulation leads to a stable matching.
Lemma 3.1. Under the men-proposing DA mechanism, a group manipulation by some
women W ′ is weakly beneﬁcial to all women and weakly harmful to all men if the induced
matching is stable. If the matching is not stable then each blocking pair contains a woman
from W ′.
Proof. Let P ′
W ′ be a group manipulation and let P ′ = (P ′
W ′,P−W ′). By assumption, µ(P ′) is
stable for the market P. Hence, by men-optimality of µ(P), all women weakly prefer µ(P ′)
to µ(P) and all men weakly prefer µ(P) to µ(P ′). The second statement follows from the
observation that µ(P ′) is stable for P ′ and that for each pair (m,w) with w  ∈ W ′, Pm = P ′
m
and Pw = P ′
w.
The following example illustrates that a manipulation may lead to an unstable matching,
even if the manipulating women are strictly better oﬀ at the new matching.
Example 1. (A successful manipulation that yields an unstable matching.)
Consider the matching market with 3 men, 3 women, and preferences P given by the columns
in the table below. For instance, w3Pm1 w1 Pm1 w2 Pm1 m1. One easily veriﬁes that µ(P) =
Men Women
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w3 w2 w1 m1 m1 m3
w1 w1 w3 m2 m2 m1
w2 w3 w2 m3 m3 m2
(m3,m2,m1)— the boxed matching in the table. Suppose that woman w1 submits the list
P ′
w1 = m2. Then, µ(P ′) = (m2,m1,m3)— the boldfaced matching in the table. Note P ′
w1 is
4To see this, let P ′
w be an individual manipulation. Let m = µ((P ′
w,P−w),w) ∈ M ∪ {w}. Consider
the truncation strategy P ′′
w obtained from Pw by making all men that are strictly less preferred than m
unacceptable. One easily veriﬁes that µ((P ′′
w,P−w),w)Rw µ((P ′
w,P−w),w).
5a successful manipulation since µ(P ′,w1) = m2 Pw1 m3 = µ(P,w1). But µ(P ′) is not stable
with respect to the true preferences P (the unique blocking pair is (m1,w1)). ⋄
In Example 1, all women that do not manipulate weakly beneﬁt and all men are weakly
harmed. Since the resulting matching is not stable this observation does not follow from
Lemma 3.1. Nevertheless, we will prove that the observed opposed interests are a feature
of two interesting classes of group manipulations: group truncation strategies and weakly
successful group manipulations.
For marriage markets, the next proposition generalizes the results of Crawford (1991)
from an individual empty truncation strategy to arbitrary group truncation strategies. We
include the proof, which is similar to that of Crawford (1991), for two reasons. First, for
marriage markets the arguments are shorter and more transparent. Second, it will be useful in
pointing out why the same arguments do not immediately carry over to other manipulations.
To prove our results we introduce the following additional notation. For every integer
k ≥ 1, let X(Q,w,k) be the set of men that will have proposed to woman w by step k under
DA(Q), i.e., in some step l ∈ {1,...,k} of DA(Q). Let X(Q,w) be the set of men that will
have proposed to w by the last step of DA(Q), i.e., X(Q,w) = ∪kX(Q,w,k).
Proposition 3.2. Under the men-proposing DA mechanism, any group manipulation by
women that consists of truncation strategies is weakly beneﬁcial to the other women and
weakly harmful to all men.
Proof. Let P ′
W ′ be a group manipulation of some women W ′ such that for each w′ ∈ W ′, P ′
w′
is a truncation strategy. Let P ′ = (P ′
W ′,P−W ′). It is suﬃcient to show that for each woman
w and each step k, X(P,w,k) ⊆ X(P ′,w,k). For k = 1 the inclusion is in fact an equality
since at step 1 of DA(P) and DA(P ′) each man proposes to exactly the same woman.
Assume that the inclusion holds for k. We will show that the inclusion also holds for
k + 1. Let m ∈ X(P,w,k + 1). If m ∈ X(P,w,k), then by induction, m ∈ X(P ′,w,k),
and hence m ∈ X(P ′,w,k) ⊆ X(P ′,w,k + 1). So, assume m ∈ X(P,w,k + 1) \ X(P,w,k).
Then, in DA(P), man m proposed to w at step k + 1 but not at step k. So, m was rejected
by some woman ¯ w  = w at step k of DA(P). By the induction hypothesis, m ∈ X(P, ¯ w,k) ⊆
X(P ′, ¯ w,k). If ¯ w  ∈ W ′ then ¯ w will also have rejected m by step k of DA(P ′) since P ′
¯ w = P ¯ w.
If ¯ w ∈ W ′ then ¯ w will also have rejected m by step k of DA(P ′) since P ′
¯ w is a truncation
strategy obtained from P ¯ w. Since m makes his proposals in the same order in DA(P) and
DA(P ′), he will have proposed to w by step k+1 of DA(P ′). Hence, m ∈ X(P ′,w,k+1).
The following example shows that if we replace (possibly unsuccessful) truncation strate-
gies in the statement of Proposition 3.2 by weakly successful manipulations then the key
6argument in the proof does no longer work.
Example 2. (A successful manipulation with a “rejection lag.”)
Consider the matching market with 3 men, 3 women, and preferences P given by the
columns in the table below. One easily veriﬁes that µ(P) = (m1,m3,m2)— the boxed
Men Women
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w1 w2 m3 m2 m1
w2 w3 w1 m1 m1 m2
w3 w2 w3 m2 m3 m3
matching in the table. Suppose that woman w1 submits the list P ′
w1 = m3,m2,m1. Then,
µ(P ′) = (m3,m1,m2)— the boldfaced matching in the table. Note that P ′
w1 is a successful
manipulation since µ(P ′,w1) = m3 Pw1 m1 = µ(P,w1).
Note that all other women weakly beneﬁt and all men are weakly hurt by the manipu-
lation. However, the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3.2 cannot be directly applied
here. This can be seen as follows. In DA(P), woman w1 rejects m2 in the ﬁrst step (after
which he proposes to w3, gets accepted, and the algorithm halts). In DA(P ′), the ma-
nipulating woman w1 will reject m2 in a later step (i.e., not in the ﬁrst step). Therefore,
X(P,w1,1)  ⊆ X(P ′,w1,1). Hence, the arguments of Proposition 3.2 cannot be applied to
tackle successful manipulations that are not truncation strategies. ⋄
Our second result shows that the conﬂict and coincidence of interests as observed in
Example 2 holds in fact for any weakly successful group manipulation. In other words, we
can replace the (possibly unsuccessful) truncation strategies in Proposition 3.2 by weakly
successful manipulations.
Proposition 3.3. Under the men-proposing DA mechanism, any weakly successful group
manipulation by women is weakly beneﬁcial to the other women and weakly harmful to all
men.
Proof. Let P ′
W ′ be a weakly successful manipulation of a group of women W ′ and let P ′ =
(P ′
W ′,P−W ′). It is suﬃcient to show that for each woman w and each step k, X(P,w,k) ⊆
X(P ′,w). For k = 1 the inclusion is obvious since at step 1 of DA(P) and DA(P ′) each man
proposes to exactly the same woman.
Assume that the inclusion holds for k. We will show that the inclusion also holds for
k + 1. Let m ∈ X(P,w,k + 1). If m ∈ X(P,w,k), then by induction, m ∈ X(P ′,w). So,
7assume m ∈ X(P,w,k + 1) \ X(P,w,k). Then, in DA(P), man m proposed to w at step
k +1 but not at step k. So, m was rejected by some woman ¯ w  = w at step k of DA(P). By
the induction hypothesis, m ∈ X(P, ¯ w,k) ⊆ X(P ′, ¯ w). If ¯ w  ∈ W ′ then ¯ w will also reject m
in DA(P ′) since P ′
¯ w = P ¯ w. If ¯ w ∈ W ′ then µ(P ′, ¯ w)R ¯ w µ(P, ¯ w)P ¯ w m, which implies that in
the last step of DA(P ′) woman ¯ w is matched to a man she strictly prefers to m (according
to her true preferences). Therefore, in either case ¯ w will also eventually reject m in DA(P ′).
Since m makes his proposals in the same order in DA(P) and DA(P ′), he will have proposed
to w by the last step of DA(P ′). Hence, m ∈ X(P ′,w).
Finally, we consider extending our results to the many-to-one college admissions model
where students have to be assigned to colleges with possibly multiple seats, strict preferences
over individual students, and responsive preferences over groups of students.5 Note that the
men-proposing DA algorithm and some of its properties can be straightforwardly generalized
to college admissions (such that the men “become” students, and the women “become”
colleges with possibly multiple seats). In particular, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the
students to submit their true preferences (Roth, 1985a, Theorem 5∗) under the mechanism
induced by the student-proposing DA algorithm, which will be denoted by µ. Note that a
college can manipulate not only its ordered list of students but also the number of available
seats, i.e., the strategy space is much richer than in one-to-one markets.
A minor adaptation of the proof of Proposition 3.2 shows that under the student-
proposing DA mechanism, any group manipulation by colleges that consists of truncation
strategies is weakly beneﬁcial to the other colleges and weakly harmful to all students.
However, Kojima and Pathak (2009) showed that under the student-proposing deferred ac-
ceptance mechanism, truncation strategies typically do not exhaust the strategic options of
the colleges. More precisely, they presented a many-to-one market in which for some college
there is a strategy such that any truncation strategy yields a strictly worse match. They
also proved that so-called dropping strategies constitute a class of exhaustive strategies. A
dropping strategy of a college is obtained by removing some students from its (true) ordered
lists of acceptable students (i.e., not necessarily a tail of least preferred students).6 Formally,
for a college c with preferences Pc over individual students, P ′
c is a dropping strategy if
for all students s,s′, [sR′
c s′R′
c ∅ implies sRc s′Rc ∅].
Therefore, a possible appropriate extension of Proposition 3.2 to college admissions would
involve dropping strategies rather than truncation strategies. The next example, however,
5For a formal deﬁnition of the college admissions model and responsiveness in particular, see Roth (1985a).
6The fact that dropping strategies are exhaustive implies that it suﬃces to focus on each college’s sub-
mittable ordered lists of students.
8shows that neither of our results extends to the college admissions model in an appropriate
way: there are dropping strategies and successful manipulations that strictly harm some
other college and strictly beneﬁt some student.
Example 3. (Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 cannot be appropriately generalized to
college admissions.)
Consider the following matching market with students s1,s2,s3, and s4, and colleges c1 and
c2. Each college has two seats. The preferences P over individual agents are given by the
columns in the table below. We assume that the colleges’ preferences over sets of students
are responsive to the preferences over individual students and that both colleges prefer
{s1,s4} to {s2,s3}.7 One easily veriﬁes that µ(P) = (c2,c1,c1,c2)— the boxed matching
Students Colleges
s1 s2 s3 s4 c1 c2
c2 c1 c1 c1 s1 s4
c1 c2 c2 c2 s2 s2
s3 s3
s4 s1
in the table. Suppose that college c1 submits the dropping strategy P ′
c1 = s1,s4. Then,
µ(P ′) = (c1,c2,c2,c1)— the boldfaced matching in the table. Note that P ′
c1 is a successful
dropping strategy since college c1 prefers {s1,s4} to {s2,s3}. Since college c2 is strictly worse
oﬀ and student s4 is strictly better oﬀ under µ(P ′) it follows that Propositions 3.2 and 3.3
cannot be appropriately extended to college admissions. ⋄
Remark 1. In fact, using the many-to-one market in Example 3 one can construct a marriage
market in which an individual (unsuccessful) dropping strategy of a woman makes another
woman strictly worse oﬀ and some man strictly better oﬀ (cf. Proposition 3.3).8 For two
reasons we do not provide further details and present Example 3 instead. First, the class
of dropping strategies contains the strictly smaller class of truncation strategies, which is
already exhaustive for one-to-one markets. Second, the market in Example 3 shows not only
the impossibility of appropriately generalizing Proposition 3.2 but also the impossibility of
generalizing Proposition 3.3. ⋄
Finally, we note that Example 3 uncovers another diﬀerence between marriage markets and
college admissions and adds to those already identiﬁed in Roth (1985a).
7Note that preferring {1,4} to {2,3} is compatible with responsiveness.
8We thank Bettina Klaus for pointing this out.
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